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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, t 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : Case No. 920522-CA 
v. s 
ABEL TORRES, : Priority No. 2 
Defendant/Appellant.: 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
Defendant Abel Torres appeals from his convictions of 
possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with intent to 
distribute, a second degree felony, and possession of a 
controlled substance (marijuana) with intent to distribute, a 
third degree felony, both in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-
8(1)(a)(iv) and (l)(b)(ii) (Supp. 1992). This Court has 
jurisdiction to hear the appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(f) 
(Supp. 1992). 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
The issues presented in this appeal are: 
1. Do the trial court's oral findings and unsigned 
minute entry provide this Court with an adequate basis to conduct 
meaningful appellate review of the denial of defendant's motion 
to suppress evidence? 
Whether a trial court's findings of facts and 
conclusions of law are adequate to permit appellate review is a 
legal question. LaSal Oil v. Deot. of Environmental Quality, 202 
Utah Adv. Rep. 39, 40 (Utah App. Dec. 18, 1992) (citing Adams v. 
Bd. of Review, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah App. 1991)). 
2. Even if the trial court failed to enter all 
necessary findings, does the record provide a reasonable basis 
for this Court to affirm the trial court's denial of defendant's 
motion to suppress the evidence? 
When the trial court has failed to make findings, an 
appellate court may still affirm the trial court's decision if 
"from the evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to 
support it." State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 787 and n.6 (Utah 
1991) (citations omitted). 
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES 
The text of any constitutional provision, statue or 
rule determinative of the outcome of this appeal is set forth in 
the body of this brief. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged with two counts of possession of 
a controlled substance with intent to distribute, in violation of 
Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(1)(a)(iv) (Supp. 1992) (R. 7-8). 
Defendant waived his right to a jury trial and a bench trial was 
scheduled for June 10, 1992 (R. 48). 
Five days before trial, defendant moved to suppress the 
evidence seized at the time of his arrest (R. 49). The parties 
stipulated that if the court denied the motion to suppress, the 
evidentiary hearing testimony would constitute the trial evidence 
and could serve as the basis for the court's verdict (R. 89). 
2 
At the conclusion of the evidentiary hearing, the court 
orally announced its finding that reasonable suspicion supported 
the stop and seizure of defendant (R. 163-66)- (See Addendum A 
for transcript of the trial court's oral rulings.) The court 
then reserved its ruling on the validity of defendant's consents 
to search and requested the parties to submit memoranda (R. 166-
69) (Addendum A). Subsequently, the court notified the parties 
by unsigned minute entry that defendant's motion to suppress was 
denied (R. 71). No written findings of fact or conclusions of 
law were entered. 
On July 31, 1992, judgments were entered against 
defendant for second degree and third degree possession of a 
controlled substance with intent to distribute (R. 73-74).1 
Defendant was sentenced to the statutory terms of imprisonment 
with credit for pretrial time served; the imposition of both 
sentences were stayed, defendant was placed on informal probation 
and released to I.N.S. for deportation (id*)*2 Defendant timely 
appealed (R. 75). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
On February 2, 1992, the Quad County Narcotics Task 
Force was involved in undercover narcotics operation and 
surveillance in Juab County (R. 96-98). Two suspects, Gina Keete 
1
 Defendant represents that he was convicted of one second 
degree offense (Brief of Appellant [Br. of App.] at 3). This is 
incorrect. Judgments and convictions were entered on both counts 
(R. 73-74). 
2
 The State agrees that defendant's deportation does not 
render this appeal moot. (See Br. of App. at 3 n.3.) 
3 
and Larry Thatcher, had agreed to sell one ounce of cocaine for 
$900.00 to a confidential informant who had worked with numerous 
police agencies for seven years (R. 97-98, 112, 116-17). 
Thatcher agree to take the informant to his Salt Lake City 
"source." (R. 98-99). The informant, Keete and Thatcher left for 
Salt Lake in Keete's dark blue, "almost black," 1983 Oldsmobile 
(R. 104-06 ).3 
When the suspects reached Salt Lake City, the task 
force notified the local police authorities of the purpose of the 
surveillance, gave a description of the suspects' vehicle, and 
asked the local officers to standby to assist in any arrests (R. 
107, 126-28). 
The Oldsmobile pulled into an alleyway near 400 South 
and 900 East (R. 108-09). The informant and Keete stayed in the 
vehicle while Thatcher entered a "fenced, clutter backyard"; the 
police could not observe if he entered the residence (id.. ) . 
After a few minutes, Thatcher returned to the vehicle and told 
the informant that "he doesn't have it right now . . . he will 
have to go get it." (R. 110). The three then went to a nearby 
McDonald's (R. 110-11). 
Thatcher insisted that he needed the money "fronted" 
for the cocaine. The informant was reluctant because the police 
told him not to turn over any money without first receiving the 
3
 The confidential informant wore a hidden electrical wire 
which transmitted the conversations with the suspects; visual 
surveillance was also maintained (R. 98-101). The only time 
surveillance was not maintained was for fifteen minutes just prior 
to defendant's arrest (R. 131-34). 
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cocaine. The informant decided to give Thatcher $500.00 and 
Keete "fronted" the remaining $400.00 (R. 111-12). The informant 
and Keete stayed at McDonald's and Thatcher drove the Oldsmobile 
back to the alleyway (R. 113). Thatcher again walked towards the 
residence; shortly afterwards, two people returned to the 
Oldsmobile and left (R. 130-31). 
The police began following the Oldsmobile but pulled 
back when they thought the occupants of the vehicle had detected 
the surveillance (R. 131-32). Based on the previously overheard 
conversations between the suspects and the informant, the police 
believed that the vehicle was going to the "source" but would be 
returning to the alleyway (id.. ). The police positioned 
themselves at locations which the Oldsmobile would need to pass 
to return (R. 132). Fifteen minutes later, the Oldsmobile was 
spotted at 900 West 400 South (R. 133-34).4 The vehicle was 
stopped (R. 132-33, 147-48). To the surprise of the police, 
Thatcher was no longer inside but defendant and his wife were (R. 
135). 
Defendant only spoke Spanish (R. 135). A Spanish-
speaking officer read defendant his Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 
436, 86 S. Ct. 1602 (1966), rights in Spanish and then 
interviewed him (R. 136-37, 150-52).3 Even though the police 
* Even though the surveillance had been pulled back, the 
officer who stopped the Oldsmobile testified that he knew it was 
the same vehicle because of its license plate number (R. 134). 
5
 The officer stated that he had studied Spanish in high 
school, was raised by a mother who primarily spoke Spanish, and is 
married to a Hispanic woman whose first language is Spanish (R. 
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had no prior knowledge of defendant's involvement, the officer 
told defendant that they had been watching him and knew that he 
had just purchased cocaine (R. 137, 154-55). The officer asked 
defendant where the cocaine was and defendant said it was under 
the passenger seat (R. 137). The cocaine was seized and 
defendant arrested (R. 137-38). Based on the overheard 
McDonald's conversation, the officers also believed that 
defendant possessed marijuana (R. 138). Defendant was questioned 
and admitted that he had marijuana in his home which backed up to 
the alleyway where Thatcher had twice parked (id.• ). Defendant 
said he would turn it over to the police; they went to the home 
and recovered the marijuana (R. 138-39). 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The trial court failed to enter sufficient findings of 
fact and conclusions of law to permit meaningful appellate 
review. While the court properly found the stop of the vehicle 
and seizure of defendant constitutional, it never explicitly 
ruled on the validity of the subsequent warrantless searches of 
the vehicle and home. Instead, after questioning the validity of 
the consents to search, the court entered a one line statement 
that the motion to suppress was denied. 
Further, the record provides no reasonable basis for 
this Court to assume that the trial court found the facts 
necessary to support affirmance of its decision. The evidence 
surrounding the voluntary and knowing nature of defendant's 
149, 152). 
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consents to search is conflicting and turns on credibility 
assessments. The trial court's failure to rule on this critical 
issue is compounded by its erroneous view that even if the 
consent to search the vehicle was invalid, the search could be 
justified by reasonable suspicion. 
For these reasons, the State concedes that reversal of 
defendant's convictions is warranted and a new trial should be 
ordered. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO ENTER ADEQUATE 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND 
FAILED TO EXPLICITLY RULE ON THE VALIDITY OF 
THE CONSENTS TO SEARCH. 
In State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770 (Utah App. 
1990), this Court made clear the necessity for a trial court to 
enter adequate findings of fact and conclusions of law. For even 
when 
the decision not to suppress may have been 
correct, the critical "issues are for the 
trial court to decide and . . . the findings 
of fact must reveal how the court resolved 
each material issue." 
Id. at 771 (quoting Acton v. Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 
1987)). The Utah Supreme Court has recently re-emphasized that 
if a trial court fails to enter findings of fact, the appellate 
court may "assume that the trier of facts found them in accord 
with its decision, and . • • affirm the decision if from the 
evidence it would be reasonable to find facts to support it." 
State v. Ramirez, 817 P,2d 774, 787 (Utah 1991) (citations 
7 
omitted). But when it would not be reasonable to assume that the 
trial court actually made such findings, reversal is mandated. 
.Id.* at 787-88 n.6 (clarifying when a harmless error analysis is 
applicable). 
Here, the trial court properly found the stop and 
seizure of defendant constitutionally valid (R. 164-66). See 
State v. Chapman, 841 P.2d 725, 727-28 (Utah App. 1992). The 
trial court, however, orally questioned the validity of 
defendant's consents to search. At the conclusion of the 
evidentiary hearing on the motion to suppress, the court stated: 
Now, I will also find that at the time of the 
stop the defendant was driving the vehicle 
together with a female identified as his wife 
and that Officer Lyman attempted to state the 
Miranda warning in both English — I don't 
think he even tried in English but in 
Spanish. I am not convinced that the 
defendant understood what was going on and I 
am not sure the he understood and perceived 
his rights to counsel before making a 
statement. I do have some doubt about his 
consent to search the car and his home. I am 
almost willing to rule however that there was 
a reasonable articulable suspicion that there 
were narcotics and drugs, that he was part of 
the drug transaction and the search of the 
car was reasonable under those circumstances. 
But if you want to brief it, that's fine. 
(R. 164-65). When counsel continued to argue over the validity 
of the consents to search, the court opined that it did not 
believe that a consent was necessary to search the vehicle as 
that search could be supported by "reasonable suspicion" (R. 165-
66)• The court did not make clear if it believed the warrentless 
search of the home could be justified absent consent (.id.). The 
court repeated that it was prepared to rule that the stop was 
8 
constitutional but would reserve ruling on the validity of the 
searches (R. 165-67). (The transcript of the court's oral 
findings is attached in Addendum A). 
Subsequently, the parties submitted written memoranda. 
In his memorandum, defendant acknowledged that the court had 
ruled that the stop was valid but argued that the consents to 
search were not "voluntary and knowing" (R. 52-56). The State 
responded that the consents were valid, but in any case, exigent 
circumstances justified the warrantless search of the vehicle (R. 
57-63). Without further hearing, the court issued an one line 
unsigned minute entry denying the motion to suppress (R. 71). (A 
copy of the minute entry is attached in Addendum B). No 
additional findings were entered. 
The failure to explicitly rule on the validity of the 
consents to search is compounded by the trial court's erroneous 
view of the law. The court expressed that even if the consent to 
search the vehicle was invalid, the search would still be 
justified by "reasonable suspicion" (R. 165-66). Neither counsel 
corrected this misstatement (id..)- See State v. Larocco, 794 
P.2d 460, 468 (Utah 1990) (in the absence of consent, probable 
cause is required to search a vehicle). Additionally, there is 
no record indication that the court considered the State's 
alternative argument that exigent circumstances justified the 
search. See State v. Morck, 821 P.2d 1190, 1194 (Utah App. 
1991). 
Thus, it is unclear from this record whether the court: 
9 
(1) reversed its original thinking and found 
the consents to search valid, thereby, 
upholding the searches of the vehicle and 
home; 
(2) retained its original thinking that the 
consents to search were invalid, but upheld 
the search of the vehicle on the erroneous 
ground that "reasonable suspicion" supported 
the search and that some other basis 
supported the search of the home; or 
(3) did not consider the consent issue but 
found the vehicle search supported by 
probable cause and exigent circumstances as 
argued by the State in its memorandum, and 
applied similar thinking to the search of the 
home. 
Under these circumstances, the State agrees with 
defendant that the trial court failed to enter findings of fact 
and conclusions of law on all necessary issues. 
POINT II 
THE RECORD IS INSUFFICIENT TO ASSUME THAT THE 
TRIAL COURT FOUND FACTS TO SUPPORT THE 
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE SEARCHES, THEREFORE, 
DEFENDANT'S CONVICTIONS MUST BE REVERSED AND 
A NEW TRIAL ORDERED. 
For the reasons stated in Point I, the court failed to 
explicitly rule on the validity of the consents to search or on 
the existence of probable cause and exigent circumstances to 
otherwise support the warrantless searches. Resolution of these 
issues are factual. State v. Sepulveda, 842 P.2d 913, 918 (Utah 
App. 1992); Morck, 821 P-2d at 1194. 
But even when necessary factual findings are omitted, 
the appellate court may affirm the lower court decision if it is 
reasonable to assume that the trial court actually made such 
findings. Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-88 n.6. Here, the record 
10 
does not provide a reasonable basis to assume that the trial 
court found the necessary facts to support affirmance. 
Conflicting evidence existed concerning the voluntary and knowing 
nature of defendant's consents to search (R. 135-139, 159-62). 
The court's only comment on the issue was its tentative remarks 
that it doubted defendant's understanding of English and the 
circumstances surrounding the stop and search (R. 164-65). But 
the trial court withheld final ruling and requested briefing 
(R. 165-67). Additionally, the court erroneously stated that 
even if the consents were invalid, the search of the vehicle 
could be justified by "reasonable suspicion" (R. 164-65). The 
court expressed no view of whether alternative grounds could 
support the warrantless search of the home (id.). Further, the 
issue of exigent circumstances was only raised in the State's 
written memorandum (R. 61-62). Despite these unresolved factual 
matters, the court's subsequent minute entry denied defendant's 
motion without explanation (R. 71) (Addendum B). 
Since the record does not provide a basis to 
necessarily assume that the trial court found that defendant had 
validity consented to the searches or that the warrantless 
searches were otherwise justified, reversal is appropriate. 
Ramirez, 817 P.2d at 787-89. 
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CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, defendant's convictions 
should be reversed and a new trial ordered. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /<% day of March, 
1993. 
JAN GRAHAM 
Attorney General"^  
CHRISTINE F. SOLTIS 
Assistant Attorney General 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that a true and accurate copy of 
the foregoing brief of appellee was mailed, postage prepaid, to 
Ronald S. Fujino, Brooke C. Wells, Salt Lake Legal Defender 
Assoc, 424 East 500 South, Suite 300, attorney for appellant, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111, this /(a day of March, 1993. 
(/few* 
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ADDENDA 
ADDENDUM A 
1 
2 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
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13 
14 
15 
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19 
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MR. SKORDAS: No, Your Honor. 
MS. WELLS: Unless the court feels that it has 
sufficient information about the case and the law that 
governs it, and we are prepared to rule now, I am prepared 
to ask that it be briefed. 
THE COURT: No problem. Do you want to brief it? 
That's fine. I am willing to make some findings on the 
record, if you would like. 
MS. WELLS: That would help. 
THE COURT: I suppose Officer Lyman stated it as 
well as I could, and that is that the facts substantially 
are as indicated, that there was a contact between officer 
Ekker and a confidential informant. That that confidential 
informant contacted two individuals who agreed to purchase 
for him a quantity of cocaine for nine hundred dollars, I 
think the amount was. And that based upon that contact 
that Officer Ekker followed him as he indicated in his 
testimony and listened to a conversation between them that 
would lead him to reasonably believe that a sale of cocaine 
was going to go down in Salt Lake City. That he followed 
them in that vehicle to Salt Lake City and he in turn made 
contact with the Metropolitan— 
MR. SKORDAS: Metro-Narcotics. 
THE COURT: Metro-Narcotic8 people and asked for 
assistance. That there were Utah County officers who 
0163 
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joined that procession into Salt Lake, as well. As I 
counted, there were seven cars and I will find that there 
were seven cars and seven police officers at least followed 
the confidential informant and the two suspects to Salt 
Lake to a location on the west side of Salt Lake on Fourth 
South and about Seventh West; listened again to the 
conversation indicating that the person whom he was going 
to make contact, supply the narcotics was not then 
available, took them back to McDonald's Drive-in or Store 
and that he and the lady went in and remained while the 
other suspect took the vehicle that they had driven there 
and left. That Officer Lyman was in contact with Mr. Ekker 
and others who were pursuing his vehicle. And that he in 
turn engaged in a stop of that vehicle based upon the 
information that he had from Officer Ekker and from the 
observations that he made. 
Now, I will also find that at the time of the 
stop the defendant was driving the vehicle together with a 
female identified as his wife and that Officer Lyman 
attempted to state the Miranda warning in both English — I 
don't think he even tried in English but in Spanish. I am 
not convinced that the defendant understood what was going 
on and I am not sure that he understood and perceived his 
rights to counsel before making a statement. I do have 
some doubt about his consent to search the car and his 
0164 
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home. I am almost willing to mile however that there was a 
reasonable articulable suspicion that there were narcotics 
and drugs, that he was part of the drug transaction and 
that the search of the car was reasonable under those 
circumstances. But if you want to brief it, that's fine. 
MS. WELLS: I think, two things with regard to 
your findings, I would ask the court to consider including 
in those verbal findings two things, that once Detective 
Lyman began the observation of the car, that the — he lost 
sight of the car for a period of approximately fifteen 
minutes and re-encountered the car by positioning himself 
in what he thought to be a logical return route. 
TEE COURT: I will make that a finding. 
MS. WELLS: The additional fact I think that has 
been proved is that when the stop was made that the 
individuals in the car did not match the description of the 
people who were believed to have — or supposed to be in 
the car. 
THE COURT: I agree. I will make that finding. 
I think the issue is whether or not it is reasonable and 
there is a reasonable inference that the defendant was a 
part of this entire transaction because of the events and 
circumstances that had occurred before the stop. 
MS. WELLS: I am assuming from what the court 
said you are prepared to rule today that there was 
0165 
reasonable articulable suspicion to stop. I have heard the 
court indicate some concern over the subsequent waiver and 
consent. Is that an issue that you are still — 
THE COURT: I don't think you need address that. 
I think I am willing to—am ready to concede there was 
probably no proper waiver and consent for the search of the 
house at least. But I am not sure that you need a waiver 
and consent to search the car and the circumstances of that 
search. Are you arguing that they — that the consent was 
necessary to search the car? 
MS. WELLS: Yes. 
THE COURT: Mr. Skordas, do you believe that to 
be the fact? 
MR. SKORDAS: No. I am concerned a little about 
the consent. I have seen enough people who speak foreign 
languages come to court and play games as far as their 
knowledge• 
THE COURT: I agree that can be done very easily. 
MR. SKORDAS: It is my opinion that that's being 
done today, based on the officer's testimony. 
THE COURT: Let me reserve a ruling on that 
issue. If you want to --
MR. SKORDAS: I don't know how I am going to 
prove that. I can't obviously believe that— 
THE COURT: You put on everything you have got. 
COMPUTERIZED TRANSCRIPT 
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Let me indicate that I will probably want to reconsider and 
think about that issue. 
MR. SKORDAS: I think the officer testified that 
there was some conversations both in English and Spanish. 
I think it is also clear that under our United States 
Supreme Court case law that Miranda warnings and the 
individual words inside the Miranda don't need to be 
explained and defined other than do you understand each of 
the rights explained to you. If the answer is yes, the 
officer is allowed to proceed. 
TEE COURT: Let me say I am a little more 
concerned about the issue of the waiver and consent than I 
am of the issue of reasonable suspicion. 
MS. WELLS: I would ask the court to find that 
the officer admitted to deceiving the defendant prior to 
the first consent to search. 
THE COURT: I will find that he expressed some 
facts that were not factually true. 
MR. SKORDAS: The deception is though we have 
been watching you, we know you are dealing drugs and the 
defendant goes, you got me. I guess that's an exception, 
but it is not the kind of thing that would be unexpected of 
a narcotics dealer. If they don't lie or say we have got a 
warrant or, you know, he said, "We have been watching you. 
We know you have got drugs." He said, "Yeah, you are 
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right." I don't see that that is necessarily a deception. 
I am concerned about the defendant's standing to say you 
can't search the seat of this car. It is not even his car. 
Officers only see him driving it and with some suspicion 
that this car is being used to go pick up some cocaine. 
That's the reasonable suspicion that suspicion is exactly 
confirmed. The only difference is — 
TEE COURT: He is in possession of the car and 
obviously with the consent of the owner. 
MR. SKORDAS: That's not true — the owner is 
over there at McDonald's. 
THE COURT: At least he is in possession of the 
car with the consent of the person who has the right to 
have — I assume the young lady who's registered owner of 
the car is you know — what you want me to believe is 
this—she said, "Take my car and go down and get this 
stuff." 
MR. SKORDAS: I can supply cases to the court if 
you need to the effect that an onerable situation, even 
Utah, the officer is allowed to search the area in the 
immediate vicinity of the driver, passenger of the car. 
That is for primarily the driver's safety. The officer 
will testify that coke was found under the seat. 
THE COURT: If the officer has a reasonable 
articulable suspicion under the cases I am familiar with he 
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has the right to do a search of the car, doesn't he? 
MR. SKORDAS: Right. 
THE COURT: With or without consent. 
MS. WELLS: That goes to the Terry issue and 
whether the scope exceeds what he is intending to do. 
Certainly, that goes to the house. You can't forget that 
the officer said that he believed that the so-called 
consent was in part based upon the deception that the 
officer had made to him, so if we should brief that issue, 
Your Honor, when would you want us to do that? 
THE COURT: Ten days. 
If you don't want to respond, you don't have to. 
MR. SKORDAS: I want to. I will be gone two 
weeks. This is Kent Morgan's case he asked me to try. 
THE COURT: Respond within five days after you 
return. This man will sit in jail all the time? 
MS. WELLS: That's the problem. 
THE COURT: My inclination is it won't make any 
difference. He will be sitting in jail one way or another. 
MS. WELLS: I don't know, but I believe there's 
also an immigration hold. I should have that—we should 
have those in in ten days; is that right? 
THE COURT: I think so. Does that give you 
enough time? 
MR. SKORDAS: We respond ten days after. 
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MS. HELLS: Should we set a day to come back 
before you? 
THE COURT: No. Submit your memorandum. You 
will hear from me. 
(recess) 
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ADDENDUM B 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
TORRES, ABEL 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 921900405 FS 
DATE 07/21/92 
HONORABLE JAMES S. SAWAYA 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK STH 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO SUPPRESS HAVING BEEN HEARD BY THIS 
COURT AND THE MATTER OF THE COURT'S DECISION HAVING BEEN TAKEN 
UNDER ADVISEMENT. THE COURT HAVING CONSIDERED AND NOW BEING 
FULLY ADVISED IN THE PREMISES ORDERS MOTION TO SUPPRESS DENIED. 
CC: BROOKE WELLS 
GREG SKORDAS 
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